NEW YORK - s4story -- Introduction: A Broken Chain of Trust (2018–2026)

From 2018 through 2026, the American National Accreditation Board (ANAB) operated under a falsified representation on U.S. Department of State Contract No. 19AQMM18R0131, claiming to be an "underwriter" for the International Accreditation Forum (IAF). This misrepresentation—publicly echoed by private entities such as Rohloff and African Fuse—fractured the continuity of certification across aerospace, medical‑device, plastics, metals, and machine‑shop suppliers. As of this press release 3/25/2026  African Fuse – Is still live with ANAB being and underwriter for IAF & ILAC. https://www.crown.co.za/images/LatestNews/AfricanFusion/H_Rohloff_NDT.pdf

Both the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) sit on the boards of ANSI-ANAB. The FDA is not only a board member but also a paying customer. These agencies wrote the very standards that prohibit falsification, and those standards were violated at the root of the certification chain.

Aerospace Impact: Continuity Lost Across OEMs- "Original Equipment Manufacturers" and Suppliers

The aerospace sector depends on continuity of certification. Whether a supplier holds AS9100 or ISO 9001, the system is designed so that Joe's AS9100 shop and Jim's ISO 9001 shop maintain equivalent, traceable quality. That continuity collapsed the moment ANAB's misrepresentation under Contract No. 19AQMM18R0131 entered the chain.

This affects:

• Boeing
• Lockheed Martin
• Northrop Grumman
• Raytheon
• General Dynamics
• Tier‑1, Tier‑2, and Tier‑3 suppliers
• Plastics, metals, heat‑treaters, fastener manufacturers
• Small machine shops who had no knowledge of the falsified accreditation

Boeing's Lack of AS9100 and Its Role in ANAB Oversight

Boeing has operated without AS9100 certification since July 2002, despite implying compliance through its supplier portal. Boeing relied on FAA airworthiness certificates as a substitute for third‑party oversight—yet airworthiness has never superseded AS9100, and cannot.

AS9100 requires independent, third‑party auditing, which Boeing did not have.

Boeing's Position on ANAB's Management Systems Accreditation Committee (2014–2024)

From 2014 through 2024, Boeing held a seat on ANAB's Management Systems Accreditation Committee (MSAC) — the governing body with the authority to:

• grant certifications
• suspend certifications
• withdraw certifications

This committee is responsible for ensuring the integrity of accredited certification bodies.

Yet in 2018, when ANAB falsely represented itself as an "underwriter" on Contract No. 19AQMM18R0131, Boeing continued to push ANAB‑accredited certification onto its suppliers through its supplier portal.

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-ACTUAL BOEING LINK & QUOTE FROM THEIR WEBSITE -

Quality Requirements & Information

https://www.boeingsuppliers.com/become/quality/faq#accordion-a26ad9a916-item-8202308774

Boeing Quality Management System Requirements for Suppliers Frequently Asked Questions

Will Third Party Approvals Be Recognize By Boeing?
Certified quality management systems to AS 9100, AS 9110 and AS 9120 may be utilized by Boeing for approval if:

• Certification Body is accredited for these quality management system by the ANSI-ASQ National Accreditation Board (ANAB) or international equivalent; and
• Certificate of registration is to SAE AS 9104 and certified supplier is listed in the IAQG OASIS database and in good standing.

Accredited Certification Bodies (CBs) are listed at the following web site:

As of 3/25/2026 Boeings Supplier Portal, still states that third‑party registrars must be ANAB‑accredited, despite:

• Boeing knowing ANAB's misrepresentation began in 2018
• Boeing sitting on the committee responsible for accreditation oversight
• Boeing having no AS9100 certification themselves
• Boeing relying on airworthiness certificates that cannot override fraudulent documentation

This means Boeing actively required suppliers to use an accreditation body whose legitimacy had already been compromised, embedding the FRAUD deeper into the supply chain from 2018 onward.

Addendum: Boeing's Position Made Ignorance Impossible

Given Boeing's decade‑long presence on ANAB's Management Systems Accreditation Committee (MSAC), its continued enforcement of ANAB‑accredited registrars in its supplier portal, and its reliance on certification structures directly affected by ANAB's misrepresentation under Contract No. 19AQMM18R0131, it is difficult to reconcile the idea that Boeing was unaware of the accreditation breakdown. The information was available, structural, and unavoidable to anyone in Boeing's position. Whether through direct knowledge or willful blindness, Boeing occupied a role where they either knew, or they should have known, that the certification environment supporting their global supply chain had been compromised.

Medical‑Device Impact: Implants, Valves, and Life‑Critical Devices at Risk

The same broken accreditation chain affects medical‑device manufacturers operating under ISO 13485. This includes:

• heart valves
• hip implants
• knee implants
• surgical instruments
• implantable devices
• life‑support components

If the certification body is fraudulent, the entire quality system collapses, including:

• process validation
• device history records
• conformity assessments
• sterilization controls
• traceability

There is no FDA waiver for fraudulent certification.

THE FDA WROTE THE RULES—and they cannot exempt themselves from them.

The Core Issue: They Wrote the Rules They Violated!

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The FAA and FDA sit on ANSI/ANAB's board.
The FDA is also a paying customer.
These agencies authored the very standards that prohibit falsification, misrepresentation, and fraudulent documentation.

From 2018–2026, those standards were violated at the top of the certification chain—by the accreditation body itself ANSI-ANAB, under Contract No. 19AQMM18R0131.

There is no waiver, no exception, and no administrative workaround that can erase the consequences of falsified accreditation.

Applicable FAA and FDA Standards

FAA Standards

• 14 CFR Part 3 (Subpart D) — Prohibits fraudulent or intentionally false statements, omissions, and falsified records.
  
  
• 14 CFR §21.2 — Any falsified document invalidates production and airworthiness approvals.
  
  
• 14 CFR §121.9 — Prohibits fraud, falsification, and altered records used to show compliance.

FDA Standards

• 21 CFR §820.180— Requires complete, accurate, truthful, and unaltered manufacturing and quality records.
  
  
• 21 CFR §820.70 — Requires validated processes and controlled environments; fraudulent accreditation invalidates process validation.
  
  
• 21 CFR §803.50 — Requires reporting of any condition that could cause serious injury or death, including fraudulent certification environments.

The "GUBERMAN-ANOMALY-DISCOVERY https://guberman-quality.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GUBERMAN-ANOMALY-FEBRUARY-2026.docx.pdf

Addendum: Airworthiness and Medical Devices from 2018–2026

From 2018-2026, any aircraft—including airplanes, helicopters,—manufactured under the compromised accreditation system cannot rely on an FAA waiver to ensure airworthiness. No waiver can override a falsified foundation. The same applies to hardware, avionics systems, and critical components built during this period. When the certification base is fraudulent, every downstream approval becomes suspect.

Likewise, individuals who received medical devices such as hip implants, knee replacements, or heart valves during this timeframe may now have legal grounds to question the integrity of the certification environment behind their devices. These products were manufactured within a system whose accreditation chain was compromised at the top, under Contract No. 19AQMM18R0131.

This is not limited to aerospace and medical devices. The same broken chain touches automotive, electronics, plastics, metals, and global manufacturing sectors that relied on ANAB's misrepresented status. This is not an American problem — it is a global systemic failure.

Closing Statement

When the system that certifies safety becomes unsafe, every product it touches becomes suspect.

From aircraft to implants, from fuselages to heart valves, the years 2018–2026 represent a period where the public was asked to trust a chain of certification built on a false foundation.

This is the largest industrial fiduciary fraud ever perpetrated on humanity.

And yet, the path forward is clear: the FAA and FDA can only rebuild by following the lead of quality expert and Boeing shareholder Daryl Guberman, whose work unmasked a fraudulent system affecting aerospace, medical, automotive, electronics, and global manufacturing. The future of safety regulation now depends on embracing the same dedication to truth that exposed this failure.

"In a world built on trust, only truth can restore the foundation.Let this be the moment we choose integrity over illusion,for a future worthy of the lives it protects."

— D. Guberman, 2026

"People don't reject the truth because it's wrong. They reject it because it demands change."

- ANONYMOUS