WASHINGTON - s4story -- I'm going to talk to you straight, reader to reader.

On July 17, 2026, the FAA — the same FAA that's been tangled up with Boeing for decades — decided it was time to hand Boeing back the authority to certify its own planes. Starting July 20, Boeing can once again issue its own airworthiness certificates for the 737 MAX and the 787. FAA Allows Boeing To Resume New Aircraft Certifications https://avweb.com/aviation-news/faa-restores-boeing-certification-role/

They're calling it a "return to normal."

I call it a dangerous move that ignores the real problem.

My name is Daryl Guberman. I've been in aerospace quality for 40 years. I'm a Boeing shareholder. I've lived inside this system long enough to know when something is being dressed up to look fixed when it isn't.

Let me walk you through this in plain language.

Boeing Still Isn't AS9100 Certified — And Now They're Trying to Hide the Standard

Here's the part nobody in the FAA press release wants to say out loud:

Boeing is still not AS9100 certified.

And as of January 2026, the standard itself has been quietly renamed from AS9100 to AI 9100 — a move that looks a lot like an attempt to bury the fact that Boeing never held the certification in the first place.

This isn't speculation.

This was exposed publicly on June 27, 2024, when Boeing's own Vice President of Quality, Elizabeth Lund, told Reuters that Boeing was:

• "willing and prepared to get AS9100,"
• "compliant to the standard,"
• "doing internal audits as if they were certified."

Those were her words.https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/boeing-brief-european-regulators-production-090603535.html ( Last paragraph in this article "willing and prepared"

But here's what actually happened.

In October 2024, I went out to Boeing's major Washington sites — Everett, Renton, Auburn, and Northfield — and spoke directly with employees.

Every single one of them told me the same thing:

• They had never heard of AS9100.
• They were not doing internal audits.
• There was no audit trail.
• And safety meetings were discouraged because "the plane had to move to the next station."

So when the FAA says Boeing is "consistent," you tell me — consistent with what?

Because I'll tell you personally how "consistent" they were the last time they let Boeing grade its own work.

The FAA's "Consistency" Already Killed 346 People

Back in 2018 and 2019, after almost ten years of giving Boeing the same kind of self‑certification authority they're handing back on July 17, 2026, we saw exactly what that "consistency" produced:

Two crashes.

346 people dead.

Ethiopian Airlines and Lion Air.

All tied to a Boeing‑designed system — MCAS — that Boeing was allowed to self‑certify its own aircraft, aircraft technologies & aircraft designs.

And here's the part that still blows my mind.

After those crashes, an FAA spokesperson came out publicly and said — and I quote:

"The FAA never allows a company to police themselves or to self‑certify their own aircraft."

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Except they did.

For almost a decade.

And they're doing it again right now.

That's the FAA's version of "consistent."

Boeing Was Paying Boeing- FAA Inspectors — Making the Boeing CEO the De‑Facto FAA Administrator

During the period when Boeing held ODA-(Organization Designation Authorization) authority, the FAA's oversight structure became so compromised that Boeing was literally paying Boeing- FAA inspectors assigned to regulate Boeing. When the manufacturer pays their own employees as the regulator, the regulator becomes the manufacturer and visa versa.

In practical terms, this meant the Boeing CEO was functionally serving as both Boeing's chief executive and the FAA's Administrator, because FAA leadership deferred to Boeing's internal decisions, internal assessments, and internal certifications.

The FAA was not supervising Boeing — it was representing Boeing, and the public never knew it.

This isn't just my opinion — it's documented.

The Guberman Discovery lays out the full historical chain of Boeing's non‑certification, FAA delegation failures, and the structural collapse inside the conformity system:

https://guberman-quality.com/guberman-discovery-boeing/

It shows how Boeing's refusal to certify, combined with FAA delegation, created a regulatory environment where oversight was optional and accountability was theatrical.

THE FEDERAL CONTRACT FRAUD THAT CONTAMINATED BOEING'S AND AIRBUS'S SUPPLY CHAINS

Now let me tell you something that is even more serious — and almost nobody knows it.

In 2018, the American National Accreditation Board (ANAB) perpetrated a fraud on a U.S. Department of State contract.

The GUBERMAN-ANOMOLY-DISCOVERY https://guberman-quality.com/guberman-anomaly-discovery/ pages 3-9 illustrate this issue of FRAUD

The contract number was:

19AQMM18R0131

ANAB — owned by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) — falsely represented itself as an "underwriter."

Here's the problem:

Under ISO/IEC 17011 impartiality requirements (Section 4). An accreditation body cannot be an underwriter under any circumstance., it is strictly prohibited for an accreditation body to act as an underwriter.

ISO/IEC 17011 requires accreditation bodies to be:

• impartial
• independent
• free of commercial conflict
• free of financial entanglement
• strictly separated from underwriting or insurance functions

ANAB violated all of it.

This fraud didn't just break a rule.

It contaminated the entire aerospace supply chain.

Because here's what Boeing did:

Starting in July 2002, Boeing forced all its suppliers to use ANAB‑accredited registrars.

Every supplier.

Every plant.

Every part.

Every certificate.

And Airbus suppliers followed the same accreditation chain through ANAB's internationally equivalent bodies — the MLA/MRA multilateral agreement network.

When ANAB committed fraud, every certificate under ANAB and its MLA/MRA partners became compromised.

That means:

• Boeing suppliers were and still are manufacturing in fraudulent environments.
• Airbus suppliers were and still are manufacturing in fraudulent environments.
• Registration companies accredited by ANAB or its MLA/MRA equivalents never disclosed the fraud —
• Boeing and Airbus received SUP (Suspected Unapproved Parts) because the conformity chain was broken at the accreditation level.

A part manufactured in an uncertified or fraudulently certified environment is legally classified as a Suspected Unapproved Product by the FAA.

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Not because the part is defective.

Not because the supplier is incompetent.

But because the accreditation foundation is fraudulent.

And here's the part that should terrify every regulator:

As you read this press release, Boeing and Airbus suppliers are STILL manufacturing parts in fraudulent environments.

Nothing has been fixed.

Nothing has been corrected.

Nothing has been re‑certified.

The fraud happened in 2018.

The supply chain is still contaminated in 2026.

And now the FAA is handing Boeing back the authority to certify its own aircraft — on top of a fraudulent accreditation chain.

There is no waiver, no exception, and no administrative workaround when the foundation itself is flawed or fraudulent.

If you want to understand why foreign regulators — especially DGCA — are freezing Boeing and Airbus approvals, read The Guberman Analysis: https://guberman-quality.com/the-guberman-analysis/

DGCA placed Boeing and Airbus on hold because the accreditation chain itself is corrupted.

Not the factories.

Not the workers.

The accreditation foundation.

And that's why India is now delaying aircraft deliveries and expansion plans: https://www.newindianexpress.com/amp/story/business/2026/Jun/12/air-india-looking-to-defer-aircraft-deliveries-and-postpone-expansion-plans-report-2

DGCA isn't reacting to headlines — they're reacting to evidence.

The Industry Controlled Other Party — The Quiet System Built to Override FAA Authority

There is a structure in aerospace called the Industry Controlled Other Party (ICOP).

It wasn't created by regulators.

It wasn't created by governments.

It wasn't created by safety boards.

It was created by Boeing, Airbus, and Lockheed Martin.

ICOP is the backbone of the AS9100/AI 9100 accreditation chain — the same chain Boeing refuses to participate in.

And when you combine:

• ICOP
• FAA delegation
• ANAB's 2018 fraud
• Boeing's refusal to certify
• Airbus's reliance on the same accreditation chain

You get a global conformity collapse.

If you want the full picture of how Boeing's internal culture, conformity failures, and certification avoidance brought us here, read The Guberman Insight: Boeing Under the Lens: https://guberman-quality.com/boeing-under-a-lens-the-guberman-insight/

It shows the systemic behaviors — not the isolated incidents — that make FAA delegation dangerous and make Boeing's refusal to certify catastrophic.

This Isn't Just About Boeing — It's About the Entire Supply Chain in all industries

We have thousands of aircraft flying right now that were built in environments where traceability and conformity cannot be verified under AS9100 or AI 9100.

That's not a "delay problem."

That's a safety problem.

Why Did the FAA Do This Now? Simple — Self‑Protection.

The Farnborough Airshow is days away.

DGCA, CAAC, and EASA are finally paying attention.

The FAA needed a shield.

So they created one.

By declaring Boeing "fixed," they're trying to get ahead of the narrative before other regulators start asking the hard AS9100 questions — the ones Boeing cannot answer.

This isn't about trade.

This isn't about production.

This is about liability.

The Real Story: We're Flying on Suspected Unapproved Parts

When a manufacturer "Boeing" refuses certification for 24 years, every part that enters that environment becomes a Suspected Unapproved Product (SUP).

That's aerospace law.

And no eight‑month FAA "review period" can erase that.

THE BOTTOM LINE

I don't deal in guesses.

I deal in AS9100, AI 9100, root cause analysis, and documented evidence.

And the evidence says this:

There is no waiver, no exception, and no administrative workaround when the foundation itself is flawed or fraudulent.

Until Boeing submits to the same independent certification they demand from their smallest suppliers, none of these FAA "all‑clears" mean anything.

Not to regulators.

Not to engineers.

Not to passengers.

Not to you.

The FAA can issue press releases.

But they can't fix a broken conformity chain with PR.