NEW YORK - s4story -- 40 Year Quality Expert- Boeing Shareholder, Systemic risk advisor and forensic archivist Daryl Guberman has released a new evidentiary briefing outlining a cross industry certification failure affecting aerospace, defense, cybersecurity, food safety, medical devices, plastics, metals, and global supply chain manufacturing.

According to Guberman's findings, all certifications issued under ANAB (American National Accreditation Board) and its international equivalents operating under the Multi Regional Agreement (MRA) and Multilateral Agreement (MLA) structures may be unreliable from 2018 to the present. MRA-MLA are equivalent to ANSI-ANAB accreditation. ANSI-American National Standards Institute, took over complete ownership in 2018 of ANAB

These equivalencies include accreditation bodies operating under the former IAF (International Accreditation Forum incorporated in Delaware ) and ILAC (International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation- Australia) - both of which merged into GLOBAC-Global Accreditation Cooperation in January 2026.

Guberman states that this merger, combined with the renaming of the aerospace standard AS9100 to AI9100 in the same month, raises structural concerns requiring immediate public and regulatory scrutiny.

Aerospace Impact: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky, Airbus, and Others

Guberman's analysis highlights that the aerospace sector - which relies heavily on AS9100 series certification - is uniquely exposed.

He notes:

• Boeing operated without valid AS9100 certification for extended periods April- 2002 to present and relied on internal documentation rather than independent oversight.
  
  
• Suppliers themselves may have been unaware that their certificates were issued under accreditation structures now under scrutiny which are FRAUDULENT.

Guberman states that approximately 3,000 Boeing commercial aircraft built between 2018 and 2026 were produced during periods when Boeing did not hold AS9100 certification, while many of its suppliers operated under fraudulent AS9100 accreditation's. Because AS9100 governs supplier level quality systems, material traceability, and component level qualification, Boeing's internal quality structure and FAA airworthiness certificates cannot retroactively validate manufacturing environments that were never compliant with AS9100 requirements.

In certification terms, these 3,000 aircraft are effectively INVALID, as no regulatory mechanism exists to "repair" or legitimize production conducted under invalid or fraudulent quality system credentials. Guberman further notes that more than 12,000 commercial aircraft and over 400+ military aircraft built between 2002 and 2026 fall within the broader window where certification oversight may not have met AS9100 requirements.

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He emphasizes that FAA airworthiness certificates evaluate only final assembly and visible conformity - not the underlying materials, components, or supplier level quality systems that AS9100 is designed to control. The long standing belief that FAA airworthiness equates to AS9100 certification is a mistaken belief that has been repeated for decades within both the quality community and regulatory culture.

The "GUBERMAN-ANOMOLY-DISCOVERY Guberman Anomaly https://guberman-quality.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/GUBERMAN-ANOMALY-FEBRUARY-2026.docx.pdf

Defense Sector Exposure

Defense programs relying on AS9100 series certification - including F 35 production, rotary wing platforms, and classified systems - may also be affected.

Guberman notes that suppliers delivered materials under certificates they believed were valid, while OEMs relied on accreditation structures now under scrutiny which are FRAUDULENT.

Cross Industry Contamination

The issue extends far beyond aerospace and defense.

Industries relying on ANAB or MRA/MLA equivalent accreditation include:

• Cybersecurity (CMMC, CMMI, ISO 27001)
• Medical devices & life sciences (ISO 13485)
• Food safety & packaging (ISO 22000, FSSC 22000)
• Automotive (IATF 16949)
• Plastics, metals, and materials manufacturing (ISO 9001 and derivatives)
• Electronics & PCB assembly

Guberman states that any product manufactured under potentially invalid accreditation may require grounding, quarantine, sterilization, or invalid, depending on the sector.

Federal Contract 19AQMM18R0131 (2018)

Guberman's briefing references a 2018 federal contract Department of State - 19AQMM18R0131 - in which ANAB acted as an underwriter.

He asserts that contradictions in ANAB's accreditation status during this period create systemic exposure for federal procurement programs.

International Oversight Concerns (2015-2021)

Guberman highlights the period from 2015-2021, during which Xiao Jianhua chaired the IAF.

Guberman notes:

• Xiao Jianhua simultaneously served as Chief Executive of the China National Accreditation Service (CNAS) in Beijing.
  
  
• In 2017, CNAS certified an ill prepared biosafety laboratory in Wuhan. https://www.prlog.org/13078085-the-wuhan-lab-wasnt-just-certified-it-was-enabled-how-us-accreditation-helped-build-global-crisis.html
  
  
• In 2017, Xiao Jianhua was subject to China's National Intelligence Law, Article 7, which mandates cooperation with state intelligence services.
  
  
• This law requires Chinese nationals to provide data, access, and information to the Chinese government upon request.

Guberman states:

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"In 2018, under federal contract 19AQMM18R0131, the U.S. Department of State effectively invited an accreditation structure overseen by a Chinese national Xiao Jianhua- mandated under Article 7 to provide data to Beijing - into a federal procurement chain."

He notes that U.S. defense and aerospace suppliers were required to accept certifications accredited under the IAF association during this period, creating additional oversight and national security concerns.

Conformity Assessment Failure

When accreditation is invalid:

• Certificates are void
• Products cannot be assumed safe or compliant
• Regulators cannot waive or retroactively validate invalid certification, like the FAA

Guberman states:

"There is no legal or technical mechanism to legitimize production built on fraudulent accreditation."

Summary of Findings

Guberman concludes:

• Certifications issued under ANAB and MRA/MLA equivalent bodies from 2018-2026 are unreliable and fraudulent
  
  
• Aerospace, defense, cybersecurity, medical devices, food safety, and manufacturing sectors are all affected by the fraudulent certifications.
  
  
• Products built under invalid accreditation may require grounding, quarantine, sterilization, or invalid.
  
  
• The merger of IAF/ILAC into GLOBAC-Global Accreditation Cooperation and the renaming of AS9100 to AI9100 in January 2026 warrant further investigation.
• The issue is global and affects every industry equally.
  
  
• FAA airworthiness certificates cannot retroactively validate invalid manufacturing environments.

Statement from Daryl Guberman

"This is not an aerospace problem - it is a global accreditation problem. From 2018 to the present, every industry that relied on ANAB or MRA/MLA equivalent accreditation may have unknowingly operated under fraudulent certification. The public deserves transparency, and regulators must address the systemic contradictions that allowed this to occur." ANAB is still being advertised as an underwriter for IAF-ILAC on African Fuse a technical magazine as here: https://www.crown.co.za/images/LatestNews/AfricanFusion/H_Rohloff_NDT.pdf

ABOUT DARYL GUBERMAN

Daryl Guberman is a 40 year quality expert, Boeing shareholder, systemic risk advisor, and forensic archivist with cross industry experience spanning aerospace, medical devices, food safety, cybersecurity, and manufacturing. As CEO of Guberman PMC LLC since 2011, he has led investigations and documentation efforts that have reshaped public understanding of accreditation integrity and supplier level oversight. Guberman has exposed what he identifies as the largest industrial fiduciary breakdown in modern U.S. manufacturing history - an exposure unmatched by any individual, organization, or entity. His work combines technical depth, archival precision, and a commitment to public accountability, establishing him as a singular voice in the national conversation on quality, safety, and systemic risk.