Popular on s4story


Similar on s4story

The NADCAP Chain Reaction: How Post 9/11 Policy, Industry Self Policing, and a 2018 Accreditation Breach Put Aerospace Safety in Freefall

S For Story/10699817
40 Year Quality Systems Expert And Boeing Shareholder Daryl Guberman Exposes How Boeing's April 2002 NADCAP Mandate, The Rise Of ICOP, And A Single 2018 Accreditation Misrepresentation Quietly Destabilized Global Aerospace Conformity.

NEW YORK - s4story -- April 2002 — NADCAP Mandate

Acronym Definitions


Essential acronyms used throughout this press release:
  • AS9100 — Aerospace Quality Management System Standard
  • ANAB — ANSI National Accreditation Board
  • IAF — International Accreditation Forum
  • ILAC — International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation
  • GLOBAC — Global Accreditation Cooperation (IAF & ILAC merged 2026)
  • NADCAP — National Aerospace and Defense Contractors Accreditation Program
  • PRI — Performance Review Institute
  • ICOP — Industry Controlled Other Party
  • FAA — Federal Aviation Administration
  • ODA — Organization Designation Authorization
  • OEM — Original Equipment Manufacturer
  • SUP — Suspect Unapproved Parts
  • LFEC — Low‑Frequency Eddy Current Testing
  • UT — Ultrasonic Testing
ATTENTION: SPECIAL‑PROCESS OWNERS, REGISTRARS, CEOs, AND ANYONE WHO TOUCHS A HEAT‑TREAT OVEN, WELDING TORCH, OR NDT STATION.

If your company performs NADCAP special processes,heat treat, welding, coatings, plating, chemical processing, NDT, or materials testing — you need to understand something the accreditation world never told you:

Your NADCAP certification has been compromised since 2018.

Not because of your audit.

Not because of your procedures.

But because ANAB perpetrated a fraud stating itself as an underwriter ISO/IEC 17011 — Accreditation Body Competence Standard the underwriter designation is forbidden. On a U.S. Department of State contract 19AQMM18R0131 which contaminated the entire global accreditation chain — including every MRA and MLA equivalent accreditation body worldwide.

I'm Daryl Guberman, a 40‑year aerospace quality‑systems expert and Boeing shareholder. Over the past twenty-plus years, I've uncovered structural vulnerabilities inside the accreditation ecosystem that governs aerospace conformity, special‑process oversight, and supplier certification in all industries worldwide.

Independent Voice America Couldn't Silence: A 40‑Year Aerospace Expert Turned Media Force https://www.prlog.org/13155809-the-independent-voice-america-couldnt-silence-40year-aerospace-expert-turned-media-force-after-mainstream-news-tried-to-bury-the-truth.html

These findings reveal how the Performance Review Institute (PRI) — and its flagship program, NADCAP — became entangled in a contaminated accreditation chain following ANAB's 2018 misrepresentation.

What NADCAP Is — And Why It Matters

NADCAP oversees critical special processes:
heat treat, welding, NDT, chemical processing, coatings, materials testing, and fastener/metals manufacturing. NADCAP audits special processes — but does not certify quality management systems. PRI itself must hold valid ISO‑based conformity certifications issued by ANAB or an ANAB‑equivalent IAF MLA member.

More on S For Story
The GUBERMAN Anomaly Discovery

https://www.prlog.org/13135649-the-guberman-anomaly-discovery-exposes-certification-meltdown-pri-medaccred-nadcap-and-anab-pulled-into-structural-fraud-no-regulator-can-waive.html


When ANAB's accreditation chain becomes contaminated, PRI becomes contaminated, and NADCAP becomes contaminated.

Boeing's Post‑9/11 Oversight Collapse — And the NADCAP Substitution

After 9/11, Boeing issued two supplier bulletins that reshaped aerospace conformity.

April 2002 — NADCAP Mandate

Suppliers were required to obtain NADCAP accreditation for heat treat and welding. Boeing stated NADCAP would reduce redundant audits and that business would only continue with NADCAP‑accredited processes.

How Boeing's 2002 Mandates Exposed a Collapse https://www.prlog.org/13131138-how-boeings-2002-mandates-anabs-federal-underwriter-fraud-and-the-2026-globac-merger-exposed-collapse-in-certification-across-all-industries.html

July 2002 — AS9100 Mandate

Boeing required suppliers to be certified to AS9100 — accredited by ANAB. But Boeing itself:
  • Was not AS9100‑certified
  • Has never been AS9100‑certified
  • Remained uncertified for 24 years
This contradiction is the root of the structural collapse.

March 2014 — The Email That Revealed Global Accreditation Contamination

The ANAB Vice President — also Chairman of IAF and Principal on the IAF 990 Tax Form— wrote:

"All MRA and MLA accreditation bodies are equivalent to ANAB."

"Certified once, accepted everywhere."

Once ANAB committed fraud on DOS Contract 19AQMM18R0131 in 2018, that doctrine became:

"Certified once — rejected everywhere."

ANAB Fraud in Contract 19AQMM18R0131 https://www.prlog.org/13146517-anab-fraud-in-contract-19aqmm18r0131-2018-triggers-global-mramla-collapse-invalidating-aerospace-and-cross-industry-certifications.html

Registrars
were never informed. Auditors were never informed. Suppliers were never informed. Yet audits continued worldwide under a contaminated-fraudulent accreditation chain.

This means aerospace, medical, automotive, environmental, food safety, defense, manufacturing, energy, electronics, pharmaceuticals, transportation, and heavy industry worldwide, all continued being audited under a fraudulent accreditation environment.

Auditors unknowingly perpetuated the fraud.

Every audit performed after 2018 was built on a fraudulent foundation. Every certificate issued afterward was contaminated. Every conformity claim afterward was invalid.

Because Boeing and Airbus rely on MLA/MRA‑accredited suppliers, both received parts from suppliers manufacturing in fraudulent environments — and still are presently.

Boeing's 24‑Year Non‑Certification — Confirmed by Leadership

More on S For Story
On June 27, 2024, Boeing VP of Quality Elizabeth Lund confirmed: But when I visited Everett, Renton, Auburn, and Northfield in October 2024, employees disclosed:
  • They did not know AS9100
  • They had never been trained in internal auditing
  • Supervisors blocked attendance at quality and safety meetings
  • Employees were told to stay on production instead.
Internal auditing is mandatory under AS9100 and ISO 9001. If Boeing could not remove employees from production to conduct audits, Boeing could not meet the standard.

The Structural Consequence — Aircraft Built in an Uncertified Environment

Boeing Under a Lens — The GUBERMAN Insight https://guberman-quality.com/boeing-under-a-lens-the-guberman-insight/


You cannot build an FAA‑regulated aircraft using uncertified materials, uncertified processes, or an uncertified quality system. Once an aircraft is built in a non‑certified environment, no maintenance program can bring it back into conformity.

This is the root cause of structural failures:
  • Pickle‑fork cracking
  • Bear‑strap cracking
  • Fuselage skin cracking
  • Heat‑treat anomalies
  • Subsurface failures requiring LFEC and UT
The Bear Strap Conversation https://www.prlog.org/13163449-the-bear-strap-conversation-hidden-structural-crisis-boeing-never-told-the-faa-about.html

How NADCAP Became Boeing's Substitute for Missing Certification

Because Boeing refused AS9100 certification, it relied on:
  • NADCAP special‑process accreditation
  • Supplier AS9100 certification
  • ANAB accreditation
  • IAF MLA equivalency
When ANAB committed its 2018 misrepresentation, contamination flowed:

ANAB → IAF MLA → PRI → NADCAP → Boeing suppliers → Boeing aircraft

ICOP


ICOP allowed industry to police itself — bypassing FAA oversight. This enabled in 2018 fraudulent manufacturers, fraudulent quality systems, and fraudulent special processes to be treated as certified.Even though ANAB perpetrated a fraud calling itself and underwriter.

FAA Requirements — What the Law Actually Says

FAA's governing rules — 14 CFR §21.137, §21.146, and §21.6 — make clear:
  • Boeing lacked the certified quality system required by §21.137
  • Boeing performed supplier approvals it was not legally authorized to perform under §21.146
  • Boeing misrepresented its certification status under §21.6
An uncertified OEM cannot validate certified or fraudulent supplier parts

Global Impact — Every Industry, Every Certificate, Every Supplier

Because ANAB sits inside the IAF MLA/MRA network, contamination spreads automatically.

Final Statement from Daryl Guberman

"All industries worldwide are affected by ANAB's 2018 underwriter fraud on a federal DOS contract, amplified by the MRA and MLA equivalency network. Between 2018 and the present, Boeing and Airbus received supplier parts from fraudulent manufacturing environments. ICOP indoctrinated the public and even federal agencies into believing that airworthiness and production certificates were quality certifications — but they are not. Boeing is not AS9100‑certified, and FAA rules make it clear: an uncertified OEM cannot validate certified or fraudulent supplier parts. This is how structural failures entered the global fleet — not by accident, but by design."

"All who rise while burying the truth will one day be buried by it."
-Anonymous (proverbial wisdom)

Media Contact
DARYL GUBERMAN
***@yahoo.com
203 556 1493


Source: GUBERMAN--PMC,LLC

Show All News | Disclaimer | Report Violation

0 Comments

Latest on S For Story